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The .cries of Civil Defencc Iw1dboob and pamphleu is produced 
under the authority of the Home Secretary by the Civil Defence Depart­
ment of the Home Office with the assistance oC an in co-operatioD with 
the Secretary of State for Scotland and other MinisteR concerned. 
M..,ures for .afeguarding the civil population against the elf .... of 
war which these publications describe, have become an essential part or 
the defensive OrganllatioD of this country. The need for them is Dot 
related to any belief that war is imminent. It ia just as necessary that 
preparations for Civil Defence should be made in time of peace u it is 
that preparations should be nude for the Anncd Fo[CC:!. 
The publications cover, as far as is possible, measures which can be 
taken to mitigate the effects of all modern forms of attack.. Any scheme 
of Civil Defence, if it is to be efficienc, must be up-to-date and must 
take account of aU the various weapons which might become available. 
The "CAlc of bombing experienced In Great Britain during the 1939-4' 
war might be considerably aceeded in any furure war, and types of 
weapons and tactics which were not experienced i n  this country might 
conceivably be u�ed against it in the CUNfe. It docs not follow that any 
one of the weapom, e.g., the atomic bomb, will oecessarily be used, and 
it is most important thar a proper bal.nce iI beld between wbar is likely 
and what is possible. 
The usc of poison gas in war was forbidden by the Geneva Gas 
Protocol of 191h to which this country and all the other countries of 
the Western Union were patties. At the outbreak of a war, His Majesty's 
Government would try to secure an undertaking from the enemy not 
to use poison gas. Neverthdcss the risle of poison gas being used remaim 
a possibility and cannot be disregarded any marc thIn can certain further 
developments in other scieoti6c fields. 
The publications are doigned to describe Dot only precautionary 
schemes which 5r.:rieoce in the Jut war proved to be e:auemdy effective 
in preveotiog avoidable injury and loss of life, or wldeapread dislocation 
of natiow industries, but also the both technical and tactical, 
whieb wiu he required of the penoooel the Civil Defence Corpa if 
they are to he ready di"ec:tive1y to play their part if war should eve< br" k 
out. The rublicatioDi aim It giving the bat anilable iDf'ormatioa OG 
methods a dcCcoce against aU the .... rious w"poas. Tnf'onmtiOD is AQt 
complete in respec:t of aome of these ..... poDI and the beat m 'hoda 01 
countering them, but u resulES of aperimmtl' work aDd ociler iota'. 
UODI mature, they will be revised and .dclr-t to from rime to time 10 
that the Civil Defe!,<" Corps ::J he kept up-to-date ODd their 
may be on the mOlt modem dJ'«deacea fum . 
040. for Mmnel ota • TnWaa .. ... ,'nth • 
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Basic Methods of Protection Against High Explosive Missiles 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this pamphlet is to describe as brieRy as possible the 
effects of high explosive missi.les, and to provide an elementary knowledge 
of the principles of protection against them which is essential to all 
persons connected with Civil Defence. 
The atomic bomb, and also attacks by chemical and/or biological 
weapons, will provide their own problems which have been dealt with in 
separate pamphlets. 
]n the event of another war in which this country was engaged, the 
scale and weight of attack from the air might be heavier than any 
previously experienced in this country; but-until atomic or biological 
weapons are used-the problems presented, including the protection 
that would be needed, would be of much the same order as were occasioned 
by World War II. 
For the present it is probable that raids 'would be carried out by 
pilmed aircraft carrying normal bomb loads of high explosive, incendiary 
bombs, or parachute mines; rockets, or Aying bombs. Flying bombs 
were carried by aircraft for a short period of the last war though their 
most effective use was from fixed launching sites on the ground. Rockets 
were, of course, an entirely independent weapon also fired from bases on 
the ground. Considerable experience was gained of a1l these types of 
attack during the last war and the lessons learnt can be applied to meet 
such attacks if they should arise in future. 
Saturation Bombing 
Saturation bombing is a form of tactics which can be llsed with any 
weapons, and may be defined as a concentrated attack upon a town. 
part of a town, or other strategic target, with the object of so saturating 
the target area that the defending forces are temporarily unable to 
function. 
It was this form of bombing which was so highly developed by the 
United Kingdom and United States Army Air Forces against Germany 
during the latter part of the late war. 
Chapter I 
Types of High Explosive Bombs and their Effects 
1. Elementary Principles of Explosion 
A high explosive substance is one which is capable of ,'ery rapid 
burning; when this takes place a relatively small amount of high explosive 
is almost instantaneously converted into a large volume of gas at a very 
high temperature. This produces a very high pressure. Some high 
explosives are more effective than others. For example the aluminised 
explosives developed during the last war were considerabl), more powerful 
than T.N.T. 
When an explosion occurs above the ground the rapidl), expanding 
gases transmit a considerable shock to the surrounding air and produce 
what may be termed a «pressure pulse" this is followed by a •• suction 
wave". The word" blast" is commonly used to describe both these 
phenomena. 
When an explosion occurs underground, at a moderate depth, the force 
of the explosion will blow out the earth above it and form a crater. 
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Debris will Ix: scattered, there will be earth shock and some blast though 
the bucr will be less than (rom a burst above gmund. 
\Vhen an explosion t�kes place at a greater depth below ground the 
force of the explosion is used up in makjng an underground C2vity, 
known as a .. camouflet ", The explosive force will be transmirted 
lh[ou�h the ground as earth shock; there Will be no blast above ground. 
The dangers of a camouflet are two-fold: "rn, the roof may cave in 
when luille passes over It and people may be: Injured by fal1ing into the 
C 1\' ICY; secondly. the cnit)· will be full of poisonous gases-largely Carbon 
Monoxide so that :1 person falling IOto the: C.3.\"lty, though not Injured, 
may well dlc as a result of inhaling Carbon Monoxide. 
2. High Explosive Bombs and Fuses 
A rugh explosive bomb consists of a charge of high explosive con tamed 
In :J case fitted wah an exploder, (usc and detonator. 
The Liuckness of the case may vary from a very dun one made of stcel 
or some light alloy to a heavy sted case fined with :an armour-picrcing 
noc:e for use against objectives protected by armour or truck concrete. 
The fuc;e may be deSigned to detonate the charge :­
(I) Before reaching the target (proximity fuse), 
(II) On Impact, 
(III) i\fler a period of delay, whIch may vaey from a fncuon of a 
second, up to da)·s. 
The fuse may be functioned mechanicaUy, electrically or on the radJO 
or barometric principle. 
N.I3.- An J I.E. bomb which functlons correcd}', is said to detonate. 
Detonation may be complete, partial or incomplete, In some 
cases explosion only occurs. Apart from failures in the 
componentS, viz. fuse, detonator, exploder and main filling, the 
degree of detonauon may be affected by the dying out of the 
explosion before it has passed through the main charge, the 
unexploded portion of which is merely scattered. 
3. Type8 of High Explosive Bombs 
�roadly speaking, high uplosive bombs can be clivided into three 
m:un rypes. 
(, ) Ughl Case BombJ 
In this type the ratio of the weight of the chuge to the total weight 
of the bomb (kno\\-n as the charge,\\.'eight ratio) is highest. Detona­
tion of the L.Co bomb produces muimum blast effect whilst the 
material effect of fragmentation is negligible. 
'flus t}'pe of bomb IS normall)' fitted with an impact fuse since, if 
fused for dela)' action it would be liable to break up on hitting a 
hard target 0\\ ing to ItS thin walled construction. 
(II) J\f,dlum CUt Bomh; 
The charge weight ratio of the r..1.c. bomb is less than that of the 
L.c. bomb thus the blast effect is less and the fragmentation greater 
than tn the case of the latter. 
Any type of fuse m!ly be htted to thiS bomb. If a dela)" :action 
fuse Il> htted and the bomb penetrates the ground the dfects of blast 
and fragmentation decrea!>e with the depth of penetration, but 
lherc IS a corresponding lOcrease in the effects of earth shock. 
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(iii) Hta� Cast Bombs 
These bombs have a low charge/weight ratio and are usually 
referred to as armour piercing or semi-armour piercing and are used 
principally against heavily protected targets such as capital ships, 
important installations protected by massive reinfotced conctete, 
large shelters, submarine pens and the like. 
Being of the piercing type they are fitted with a fuse with sufficient 
delay to allow the bomb to penetrate the target before detonating. The 
damage is caused by heavy fragments and blast. 
4. Effects of High Explosive Bombs 
(i) impac, 
Any bomb which strikes a target, even though it fails to explode. 
will cause damage by its mass and momentum. The heavier the 
bomb and the more robust its construction the greater will be the 
damage, done. 
]f a large bomb just misses a target and is of such a type that it 
wiIJ penetrate the ground, even though it does not detonate, enough 
earth shock though slight may possibly cause damage to the target. 
(Ii) BlaII 
Blast from high explosive bombs will break windows and may 
remove roof coverings over a wide area. \Vithin a more limited 
area it may cause the collapse of the ordinary brick built house. 
(iii) Fragnltn/a/ion 
Fragments from bombs besides inRicting casualties can cause 
structural damage. The same applies to debris which may be flung 
violently from craters or damaged buildings. 
(iv) Earlh Shock 
As stated above the impact and penetration of unexploded bombs 
may cause slight earth shock, this effect will clearly be much greater 
from bombs detonating correctly underground. 
5. Special Types of High Explosive Bombs used in the Last War 
(i) Incendiary Bo/llbs 
The majority of incendiary bombs dropped functioned in a 
straightforward manner on impact, penetration taking place whilst 
the priming ignites the main filling. A small proportion were, 
however, fitted with an explosive attachment to discourage fire 
fighters. This device operated after the bomb had been burning 
for a short period. 
(il) Allli-ptrsolllltl &mbJ 
Anti-personnel bombs are normally of thick-walled construction 
with a low charge/weight ratio to produce maximum fragmentation 
effect. They are impact fused. 
Certain types of small anti-personnel bombs were fitted with a 
device to slow up their descent and to prevent penetration of the 
ground when used with delay fuses. In order to present the maxi­
mum hazard to Bomb-Disposal Squads and personnel in the area 
affected some were fused to explode on impact, some after a period 
of delay and others if subject to vibration or movement. 
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Special types of small liiInti-pcrsoood bombs were fitted with 
dday and anti·disturbance devices in additioo to impact fuses. 
(iij) OllJtr Atrial If/tapoll.f 
Parachute Mines, Flying Bombs and Rockets \l,'ere extensively 
used against civiljan targets. from the nature of the damage 
produced these weapons rna)' be classified as light case bombs. The 
rocket, although fitted with an impact fuse, hit the ground so fast­
about 3,000 miles per hour that a considerable crater was formed. 
asualtics and damage were caused by blast and earth shock and 
also by the outflung debris and parts of Its own machinery wrueh 
were blown in all directions and acted as addJuonaJ missiles. 
\X'hethcr the fall of a Single high explosi\'e bomb. a saturation raid 
with high explosive bombs or even a raid \\ Ith atomic bombs is 
being considered, the fundamental pnnclples undcrl)'ing their aetloo 
remain the same, save that the atomic bomb introduces addltiClnal 
ha72Cds peculiar to Ilself. 
6. Atomic Bombs 
Civil Defence Pamphlet No.6, .. Atomic \X'arfare" deals Dot onl) 
with the efTects of an atomic bomb but with the methods by which 
protection and remedial measures agalOst IlS various effects can be taken. 
Attention 1:<. drawn to the report of the Briush J\lission to Japan published 
by I l.M. t:llloner}' Office in 1946� which gives ,-aluable information in 
regard to the effects of the atomic bombs dropped at Hiroshima and 
I'\aAilsakl. 
Although the atomic bomb possesses special properties, i.e., heat Rash 
and gamma rars, !( is in many wars essentiallr a blast wearon of very 
much gre:l.lcr destructive capability than any ordinary type 0 bomb. In 
the form used against Japan the heavy damage is found within half a 
mile from ground zero (the pOint direcu)' underneath the point of burst), 
but damage of yarying degrees from blast, fire and radiation extend up 
to a radius of 21 miles. 
]O\c:.tigations made so fat' Indicate that protection designed to resist 
the effects of normal high explosi,e attack (other than direct hits) will 
give some measure of protection against the atomic bomb and that the 








PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION 
12. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS 
Pan of the object of a bombing offensive is great1y to reduce war 
production and to disrupt the life of the community . 
]f th� enemy i� t? be.prevented from a.
chieving this aim, work must go 
on until danger IS Imnunent and the ordmary day to day life of the com­
munity must be interrupted as little as may he. 
Due to the ever increasing speed of aircraft and the rocket-lype of 
missile the interval between the warning and the fall of the bomb will 
become shorter. 
Even in saturation attacks the number of direct hits on buildings is 
small compared with the number of near misses. 
Taking all these considerations into account together with the fact that 
to get protection onc must be inside the sheller bt/ore the bomb bursts. 
the following recommendations are made. 
13. TAKING COVER 
(i) In the Open 
A bomb or other missile which is going to strike very near to you if 
audible at all cannot usually be heard for more than a couple of seconds. 
If you arc exposed in the open during an anack you have not more than 
a second or two to do what you can to protcct yourself. 
The worst and most dangerous thing you can do is to run for cover 
unless, indeed, you are within one jump of it. 
Throw yourself flat. wherever you are. Lie face downwards, resting on 
the elbows. and clasp your hands behind your head. The chcst should be 
very slightly raised off the ground so as to prevent internal injury from 
earth shock. 
Blast, splinters and debris tcnd to fly outwards and UPIIY A RDS. 
Therefore, if you can manage to roll imo the gutter, do so, as the camber 
of the road and the kerb both tend to protect you. 
In open country it is sometimes possible to roll into a fold of the ground ... 
or into a ditch. 
(ii) \\'hen very near to buildings or other cover 
A wall, archway, doorway or narrow alley may give protection. It must 
be remembered, however, whether indoors or out, that shock is trans­
mined Lhrough walls, etc., so that it is dangerous to lean directly against 
any part of a building. Your head is the most vulnerable part from this 
point of view. 
(iii) When inside a building 
It is better to be near an inside wall than an outside one. 
Avoid being in a direct line with an outside door or a window. 
Remember the extreme danger from flying glass. Even interior glass 
can become a deadly missile. 
II 
One of the safest parts of a normal room is in the angle of the chimney 
breast and the wall. himney breasts are less liable to collapse than any 
other part of a bUilding. 
(Iv) Ceneral 
J t cannOt be 100 strongly emphasised that It is most important, from the 
point of view of reducing casualties as a whole, for everyone in an area 
under attack to make usc of any shelter that is available. Recent research 
has shown that there would be l�s fatal casualties if everyone were 10 
relauvely poor she:Jter than if half the population were in shelter twice a 
good and the ther half remained in the open. 
TilE RISK OF BECOMINC A CASUALTY 
ST.\:'>oOINO IN 
Till ON'" OR 
.. A ltlRUT 
LY"I!'.O DOVv>N TN TRE"'CHl'.', 
TN Til" OP1:.N GOOD mRP"�C! 
OR TN " 
SlllLTERS, OR 
STIIl.rr 
STRI)TTFO LYII';O 8011"0 
lOW COVIA. OR - 8ASOdF:'>o"n 
Ii'.: A OOORWA1" SUUTI R " A 
DRiC..: Il0USE 






STANDARDS OF PROTECTION AGAINST 
HIGH EXPLOSIVE AND 
OTHER BOMBS 
19. GENERAL INFORMATION 
The follow iog information in regard to protection afforded by different 
materials and conditions is given to afford a general background knowledge 
of the effects of High Explosive missiles. The information is of general 
interest to everyone concerned with Civil Defence. 
20. SURFACE SHELTER 
Properl), constructed surface shelters having walls of IZ in. of re­
inforced concrete or 13! in. of reinforced brickwork (Quena Bond) and a 
6 in. reinforced concrete roof tied to the walls will provide full protection 
against the effect of a JOO lb. medium case bomb exploding I, ft. awa} 
from a shelter waU, and will be capable of resisting light incendiary bomb� 
and any normal debris load. 
21. PROTECTION AGAINST BLAST AND SPLINTERS 
Protection against blast and splinters from a 500 lb. medium case bomb 
exploding )0 ft. away will be afforded by the following materials of the 
thickness indicated:-
Lateral protection 
(i) Mild steel plate . .. Il inches 
• 
eii) Reinforced concrete " " 
I 3 ! (ill) Brickwork or masonry .. ' 
(iv) Unreinforced concrete 
.. 
, S " 
(v) Ballast or broken stone .. -
(vi) Earth or sand 










Mild steel plate ... S 116 inch 
Reinforced concrete 6 inches 
Efficient brick arching .. ' 9 " 
Earth. sand or ballast 18 " 
The inside of an existing substantial build­
ing having a roof and not less than twO 
storey floors overhead, provided that the 
floor above the protected space is supported 
to enable it to resist the debris load. 
22. DEBRIS LOAD 
The strength of the roof of a shelter should also be suffIcient to with­
stand any debris load which might fall on it on the collapse of adjacem 
buildings. 
'7 
23. EARTH SHOCK 
A shelter should be designed as a complete box to enable it to resist 
canh shock. 
24. MINES A D ROCKETS 
Shelters constructed to the above requirements will also provide whole 
or partial protection against tbe effects of nUoes and rockets depending on 
their situation in relation to the point of butSt. As a rough guide it may 
be stated that complete protection can be obtained at a distance of 
70--120 fl, from the centre of the explosion, though this distance will var>� 
with the weight of the explosive charge. 
25. BOMB RESISTING STRUCTURES 
To resist a direct hit from a )00 lb. medium case bomb, a shelter will 
require a reinforced concrete roof 4 flo 6 In. thick. The walls above 
ground should be of the same thickness and below ground they should be 
7 ft. thick. 
Tunnels or ca\TCS 60 ft. below ground or 40 ft. in solid rock would 
provide equal protection. The standards quoted above would also pro­
vide protection against a direct hit by a 1,000 lb. medium case bomb, 
Ihough some damage might be caused in the compartment below the point 
of lInpact. 
Shelters providing protection against medium case type bombs also 
provide a measure of prolection agaJnst the atomic bomb. They can 
generally be so construCled as to be capable of being strengthened at a 






TYPES OF SHELTERS 
31. BROAD CLASSIFICATION 
In this chapter a brief description is given of the various types of 
�helters used successfully i n  the last war. This information is again 
lnt�nde� as, a general background of interest in helping to understand the basIc pnnClples of protection against High Explosive missiles. 
Shelters were given a broad classification by types as [01l0w5:­
(i) Domestic Shelters (for household use) 
(0) ANDERSON SHELTER. This shelter was designed for erection out­
side the house. It consisted of 14 gauge corrugated steel sheets, steel 
angles, ties and channel irons. It was normally sunk about 3 fl. into the 
ground and covered over with earth to a minimum depth of I � in., which, 
with the 14 gauge corrugated sheet gives the equivalent of t 8 in. of eanh. 
Tbe standard shelter was 6 ft. 6 in. by 4 ft. 6 in. by 6 ft. high. It was 
designed to shelter six persons, but was capable of being lengthened to 
accommodate eight, ten or twelve persons; or of being shortened to 
accommodate four persons. 
Unless the entrance was screened (within 15 ft.) by a building or existing 
wall, a screen wall had to be provided. Trouble was sometimes exper­
ienced due to flooding by subsoil water in which case the below ground 
portion was tanked by a lining of cement concrete. 
The shelter was, on occasions, erected on the surface, which involved 
casing it in cement concrete. The result was effic.iem but expensive. 
(b) MORRISON SHELTER. This shelter was designed for use in a house 
and its chief function was to protect the occupants from being crushed by 
the collapse of the building. Protection against blast and fragments was 
provided by the walls of the house, which were sometimes specially 
thickened for this purpose. 
It consisted of a steel table measuring 6 ft. 4 in. long by ; ft. lOt in. 
wide. It provided sleeping accommodation for twO adults and a child, or 
a considerable number of small children in a sitting position, when used 
as a school classroom shelter. 
(t) STRUTTED REFUGE ROOM-STRUTTED BASEhlENT. The object of 
this form of shelter was the same as the Morrison sheller, i.e. to provide 
strutting to prevent the collapse of the room and to use the waUs as pro­
tection against blast and fragments. Strutting was either steel or wood 
and the design and strength suited to the weight to be supported. 
(tf) SMALL TRENCH O R  SMALL SURFACE SHELTER IN GARDEN. 
This type of shelter needs no special comment. 
(ii) Communal or Communal Domestic Shelter 
This type of shelter was designed for the joint use of the occupants of 
twO or more houses or flats in cases where it was impracticable to provide 
shelter for individual households. 
'3 
V.uious kinds of shelter were used to sUlLlocal conditions, of which the 
pnnclpal were:· 
(0) TRI!NCIIEIi. Trench shelters wcce trenches dug in the ground with 
a suitable lining to the .. idee;, Aooe and roof and provided with entrances 
and emergenc), exits. They were constructed either wholly or partly 
helow gmund. An)" part above ground was protected by earth cover 
(18 In. of tanh) or G in. of reinforced concrete. 
Trench linings found best by experience consisted of reinforced can· 
crete au In !iitu; but limber, steel sheeting or precast concrete unIts were 
al.,o used. 
An Important cOn'iideralion was found to be the effect of earth shock on 
the 'ides of the trench which would oust the roof to collapse unless the 
de .. ign W3( o;uch as to prevent this contingenc),. 
I'ormally [rcnche .. were 4 ft. 9 in. or 7 ft. clear width \\'ith:il height of 
not Jess lhan 6 fro They were constructed in separate 50-person units, or 
dl\'ided IntO c;ectlons by changes in Irection at right angles or by baffle 
\\,.111<> <;0 thal each o;ection wouJd accommodate not more than �o pcn�ons. 
Seating or bunking was pro\"ided in accordance with the needs of the 
situation. 
(b) WR T A( J!. SI-IP.L TERS. This type of shelter, as ito; name implies, was 
com I ructed enureJy above ground. \'\'alls \\'ere of structural concrete not 
le!>s lhan 11 in. thick, or reinforced brickwork not less than 13! in. thick. 
The mof \\'as of reinforced concrete not less than 6 in. thick. The struc­
lure \\'as also designed to r�i.st earth shock. 
I f the sheller was designed to hold more than so persons it was di\-ided 
into compartments each holding a maximum of �o persons. 
AU 'iuch shellers were prm-ided \\�ith one or more entrances screened 
a�ainst blast and fragments, and a suiuble number of emergency exits 
�paccd as far aparc as possible. 
'\ny shelter sited nearer ro a buiJdlng than half the height of that 
building� had the roof designed to take the debris load from the building 
jf It should collapse. 
(f) STRUTTeD BA\EMENTS-VAULTS OR COAL CELLARS. No special 
comment 1\ needed on these twO types of shelter, both of which were 
eXlen .vely used. In the ca�e of \'auhs and coal cdlars. means of lOt�r­
communication were made where possible so as to provide emergency 
eXits, especially In rows of houses in lrpical London streets. 
The strutting was designed to carry any normal \1o'eight that might 
collap�e on the roof of the shelter. 
(iii) Public Shelters 
Public shelters were constructed or adapted as circumstances required. 
The principal trpes were:-
(0) TRENLllES-SURFACE SIIELTERS-BASEMENT SHELTERS. 
Descriptions of th se t}'pes of shelter have alreadr been given 10 the 
lI11med.mtcly preced10g sections. 
(b) RAILWAY ARCIIES. Good shelter was pro\'ided by railway archC!i 
by closing the c:.nds by reinforced brick or concrete screen walls to a height 
of not less than 8 ft. Because railway communications are especiallr liable 
10 attack howc\'er, care had always to be taken not (0 concentrate (00 




(c) TUNNELS AND CA \,E5. Tunnels with 40 ft. or more overhead 
cover were used as shelters, as also were caves where they existed. e.g. 
London Transport Tube Stations and the Chislehursl Caves. Some 
tunnel shelters were specially constructed. As with all types of shelters, 
entrances had to be adequately protected by screen walls. 1n cases where 
the lOp coYer fell below the general standard. baffle walls were proYlded 
to limit the number of persons in any one compartment. 
(d) OTHER SHELTER REQUIREMENTS. Shelters of suitable type were 
also provided for schools. factories and commercial buildings. l'\ormally 
they conformed to those already described, and many of them were made 
available to the public outside working hours . 
(t) ADDITIONAL POINTS OF INTEREST. A few tools such as picks. 
shovels and crowbars werc always kept in shelters to help the occupants 
to force a way out if they were trapped by debris. 
Originally all sheJters were provided with gas-proofing equipment. 






METHODS OF PROTECTING 
DOOR AND WINDOW OPENINGS 
37. SIMPLE METHODS 
Large numbers of casualties were caused by glass during the last war, 
and particular attention was directed towards reducing trus risk and also 
to the dangers of open doorways through which blast and splinters might 
[ravel. 
The methods emplo)'cd were simple. Door openings or windows 
were screened by baffle or screen walls of any suitable materials of a thick· 
ness equivalent to 13! in. of brickwork built up to a height 6 ft. above tbe 
floor level of the room to be protected. Sandbags were also used for this 
purpose. 
The danger from flying glass was further reduced by fixing wire netting 
of not morc than '* in. mesh on the inside of the window frame or over the 
whole of the window opening; or by pasting a fabric, such as cheese cloth 
or curtain net, on the inside so as to cover completely the glass and frame. 
The most satisfactory adhesive was found to be Rour paste with a small 










t fact?ries presented certain problems 
whl
.
ch had to be gIVen speCial conslderauon and treatment. The posicion 
vaned naturally with different types of industry, but the notes in this 
�hapter cover points of interest which were, in the main, common facmrs 
m industry. 
43. LOCATION OF PROTECTION 
1t was found essential, in the interests of production to tfy and provide 
shelter or emergency protection as close to the actual place of work as 
possible. Since factories were instructed normally to ignore the public 
warning siren and work to an emergency alarm provided by roof spotters 
or other means, the siting of the protection had to be carefully chosen and 
many methods improvised, sometimes using stacks of solid raw material� 
in shops, adapting trenches used for running heating pipes and so on. 
44. CAUSES OF CASUALTIES 
Casualties in factories were caused by glass splinters, bomb fragments 
and blast as is normal with High Explosive bombing. ]n addition, how­
ever, it was found that casualties were also caused by the blast hurling 
tools, raw materials and other things found loose in most factories and 
special precautions had to be taken to reduce this risk. Most factories 
have also a considerable roof space and even if the roof itself survived, 
parts of it were liable to be dislodged and cause injury to personnel. 
In other words it was found that, apart from the usual hazards caused 
by the explosion of a High Explosive missile, most factories provided a 
number of additional potential missiles which blast might hurl about and 
thus increase generally the risk of casualties, unless practical steps were 
taken to reduce this possibility to a minimum. 
45. PROTECTION OF PLANT 
The importance of giving special protection to important plant and 
vital points in factories, against blast and splinters, was very fully demon­
strated during the war. Comparatively trivial damage might easily sus­
pend production for days or even weeks. The most important services, 
where such special protection was required were waler, electricity and gas; 
and essential machinery required special care in some cases. 
The most usual form of protection was the provision of blast or traverse 
walls and substantial overhead cover, and, in addition, where practicable, 
of the duplication of supplies and services. 
It is of interest to note that machine tools were found, on the whole, 
the most difficult to destroy by bombing; and even though the factory 
buildings were collapsed or badly damaged, production could be started 
up again provided the necessary services could be restOred, in a surprisingly 
short time. 
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